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Application of Payments
By L. L. Briggs
If a debtor, who owes several separate amounts to one creditor,
makes a payment which is less than the total debt or less than
any one of its constituent parts, the problem of applying the
payment arises. Since the accountant may have the duty of
solving this problem, a general knowledge of the legal principles
governing such applications should prove helpful to him. Some
of the more important legal aspects of payment applications are
considered in this article.
The debtor has the right to indicate his wishes in respect to the
application of a voluntary payment. According to Chief Justice
Marshall in the leading case of Tayloe v. Sandiford (1822) 7
Wheat. (U. S.) 13:

“A person owing money under distinct contracts has
undoubtedly a right to apply his payments to whatever
debt he may choose; . . .”
In Monidah Trust Company v. Hruze (1921) 62 Mont. 444,
the court said:
"The reason for the rule which confers upon the debtor
the right primarily to direct the application of a paymens
voluntarily made by him is apparent. Until the money it
actually paid over, it belongs to him, and he may do with
it as he sees fit.”

If the creditor accepts the payment, he is bound by this action
to obey the directions of the debtor, even though at the time he
refused to admit them (In re Interborough Construction Corpora
tion (1923) 288 Fed. 334). The court, in Monidah Trust Com
pany v. Hruze, expressed the principle in these words:
“ If he (the debtor) makes a specific direction, the creditor
must observe it or refuse to accept the payment. If he
(the creditor) accepts and retains the money, the law will
treat the payment as having been applied as directed.”
In Reed v. Boardman (1838) 20 Pick. (Mass.) 441, the debtor
sent the creditor a sum of money with notice as to which account
it was to pay. The creditor refused to accept the payment on
those terms and refused to admit the payment on that account
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but did receive and retain the money. The court held that the
retention of the payment bound him to make the application
specified by the debtor.
The direction of the debtor is usually in the form of an express
declaration, although it may be a written or an oral agreement
between the debtor and the creditor (Hansen v. Rounsavell (1874)
74 Ill. 238). If the application is in words, these words must
reach the creditor in order to bind him (Pearce v. Walker (1875)
103 Ala. 250). However, the debtor is under no obligation to
make a definite statement in regard to the appropriation, since
his intent, if this is made known, is sufficient. Chief Justice
Marshall, in Tayloe v. Sandiford, cited above, said in regard to
this point:
“. . . although prudence might suggest an express direc
tion of the application of his (the debtor’s) payments at the
time of their being made; yet there may be cases in which
this power would be completely exercised without any
express direction given at the time.”

If no precise designation has been made, it may, of course, be
necessary for the debtor to prove facts that will lead a jury to
infer that he actually intended the specific application which he
claims (Hall v. Marston (1822) 17 Mass. 575).
Circumstances may reveal the debtor’s intent as to payment
applications as well as words could indicate. For example, the
denial of one debt and the acknowledgment of another with
delivery of the sum due upon it would be conclusive evidence of
the payer’s intention (Marryatts v. White (1817) 171 reprint 586).
If there are two debts, of one of which the debtor is aware, of the
other of which he is ignorant, an intention to pay the known
debt is presumed (Burchard v. Western Commercial Travelers'
Association, 139 Mo. A. 606). Should the creditor demand pay
ment of one of two or more debts and the debtor pay, the law
considers the payment to be on the demanded debt (Smith v.
Mould (1914) 149 N. Y. S. 552). Where the debtor inquires as
to the amount of a particular debt and then pays that amount,
the intention to pay the debt about which he inquired may be
reasonably inferred (New York v. Angelo (1911) 129 N. Y. S. 713).
However, if circumstances are depended upon to indicate the
application, it is essential that knowledge of them reach the
creditor, because the mere intention on the part of the debtor to
appropriate, of which the creditor is unaware, will not bind the
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latter (Delaware Dredging Company v. Tucker Stevedoring Com
pany (1928) 25 Fed. (2d) 44).
Should the debtor pay with one intent and the creditor receive
with another, the intent of the former will govern.
After the debtor has made the application, the creditor has no
right to divert the money without the consent of the payer
(Treadwell v. Moore (1852) 34 Me. 112). Should the creditor
apply the money upon a debt, other than the designated obliga
tion, and the debtor fail to object, such failure to act is not
necessarily an acquiescence to the appropriation made by the
creditor (Ballantine v. Fenn (1914) 88 Vt. 166) because the
debtor may be ignorant of the diversion (Fargo First National
Bank v. Roberts (1891) 2 N. D. 195).
An entry made by the debtor on his records when the payment
is made is an appropriation if this fact is communicated in some
way to the creditor (Stone v. Rich (1912) 160 N. C. 161). If
the creditor receives a payment and credits a particular item in
the debtor’s account and then notifies the payer of that entry,
and he makes no objection, such action is considered a consent
to the application by the creditor (Seymour v. Marvin (1851) 11
Barb. (N. Y.) 80). If the creditor fails to notify the debtor of
the entry, the creditor’s action is taken as evidence of an appli
cation by some of our courts (See 3 Williston, Contracts (1920),
Section 1799). However, the English view, that such entries
have no effect, seems more reasonable (Simson v. Ingham (1823)
2 B. & C. 65).
The law sets a time for application of the debtor by stating
that he must make it at or before the time the creditor receives
the money (California Bank v. Webb (1884) 94 N. Y. 467).
One court (Petty v. Dill (1875) 53 Ala. 641) maintained that the
debtor must act, at least, before the creditor has applied; but,
even where the creditor has not applied, the debtor is not per
mitted to direct application long after the payment has been
made (Dean v. Womack, 2 Tenn. Ch. A. 72) without the consent
of the creditor (Royal Colliery v. Alwart (1916) 276 Ill. 193).
The court, in In re American Paper Company (1919) 255 Fed.
121, held that the debtor may not apply a payment after litiga
tion in regard to it has been instituted.
The debtor may, at the time of payment, change a direction
previously given (Ray v. Borgfeldt (1915) 169 Cal. 253) but after
payment has been made he has no right to change the appropria
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tion without the creditor’s consent (Hodge v. Hoppock (1878)
75 N. Y. 491). But should the creditor consent to change of
application after payment he will be bound by such agreement
(Thompson v. Reeves (1926) 170 Ark. 409).
Where the debtor makes a voluntary payment and fails to
make a definite designation and gives no indication of his inten
tion as to the application of the payment, the creditor, with
certain restrictions which will be taken up later, is given the
right to apply the payment to any one of the several debts that
he sees fit (United States v. Kirkpatrick (1824) 9 Wheat. (U. S.)
720; Jones v. United States (1849) 7 How. (U. S.) 681; In re
Lindau (1910) 183 Fed. 608). Chief Justice Marshall, in Field
v. Holland (1810) 6 Cranch. (U. S.) 28, said:
“ . . . When a debtor fails to avail himself of the power
which he possesses, in consequence of which that power
devolves on the creditor, it does not appear unreasonable
to suppose that he is content with the manner in which the
creditor will exercise it.”

The performance of some act which shows the intention
specifically to apply the payment to a particular debt constitutes
appropriation on the part of the creditor (Reynolds v. Patten
(1894) 30 N. Y. S. 1050). Circumstances as well as express
declarations may indicate the creditor’s intent (Felin v. First
Mortgage Guarantee (1915) 248 Pa. 195). However, the mere
intent to apply is not sufficient, according to the court in Schoon
over v. Osborne (1902) 117 Iowa 427).
These are some of the acts which are evidence of application
on the part of the creditor: entry of credit on a particular account
(Jones v. United States (1849) 7 How. (U. S.) 681); indorsement
of payment on a note (Sanborn v. Cole (1891) 63 Vt. 590) if
notice be given the debtor; institution of a suit by the creditor,
in the jurisdictions where the creditor may apply at any time
prior to judgment or verdict (State v. Blakemore (1918) 275
Mo. 695).
Naturally, the creditor will wish to apply the payment to the
item or items which he thinks are least likely to be paid, and, with
certain restrictions, the law will support him if he makes such an
appropriation (Hildreth v. Davis, 6 Kulp (Pa.) 336). If other
rules do not prohibit, he is given the right to apply the payment
to debts not secured (Turner v. Woodard (1919) 259 Fed. 737)
or he may select the most precarious of the secured claims. (In
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re Lysaght (1903) 1 Ir. 235). If one of the debts is the sole
obligation of the debtor, and the others are with surety, guar
antor or joint debtor, the creditor may apply a general payment
by the debtor from his own funds to the debt which is not pro
tected and continue to hold the surety or others bound. If one
debt is a bond, or covenant under seal, and the other is by a
simple contract or open account, the creditor may appropriate a
payment to the latter {Mayor v. Patten (1808) 8 Cranch (U. S.)
317). Should one debt be by judgment and the other by simple
contract, the creditor has the privilege of application to the
latter (Richardson v. Washington Bank (1842) 3 Mete. (Mass.)
536). In case of two different accounts, one of which is later than
the other, the creditor, if he so desires, may apply the payment
to the later account {Henry Bill Publishing Company v. Utley
(1892) 155 Mass. 366) or he may apply half of the payment to
each of the accounts if neither is barred by the statute of limita
tions {Beck v. Haas (1892) 111 Mo. 264).
Although there are some contrary decisions, the general rule,
in respect to running accounts, is that the creditor may apply
the payment as he chooses {Sheppard v. Steele (1870) 43 N. Y.
52). Consequently, he may apply to the oldest items (Jones v.
United States (1849) 7 How. (U. S.) 681) even though these items
are barred by the statute of limitations {Brown v. Osborne (1910)
136 Ky. 456). However, if he applies without making known
his intention to apply to a specific item, the presumption is that
he applies to the oldest {American Woolen Company v. Maaget
(1912) 86 Conn. 234).
There are some restrictions upon the rights of the creditor to
apply when the debtor fails to exercise his privilege of appro
priation. The courts insist that the debtor must have known
and have voluntarily given up his right to direct the application
of the payment which he has made before the creditor may
apply. In Bancroft v. Dumas (1849) 21 Vt. 456, the court went
so far as to hold that the creditor must make the application in
such a way that the debtor could have no reasonable objection.
In some circumstances, on account of the relation in which he
stands to third persons, or from agreement with them, expressed
or implied, he may be obliged to make a particular appropriation.
For example, if the debtor who owes the creditor also owes a
party for whom the creditor is trustee, a general payment by the
debtor must be applied pro rata between the creditor’s debt and
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that of the party for whom he is trustee, since a trustee is bound
to take the same care of his cestui que trust’s interests that he
does of his own (Scott v. Ray (1836) 18 Pickering (Mass.) 361).
A prior legal debt must be given preference over a later debt in
equity. If there are several debts, and only one of these is valid,
the creditor must apply the payment to this debt, without any
consideration whatever of the order in point of time in which this
item appears on the records (Backman v. Wright (1855) 27 Vt. 187).
If a debt is due at the time an unappropriated payment is
made, the courts assume that the creditor will apply the payment
to such debt, in preference to those which are not due at that
time (Baker v. Stackpoole, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 420). The creditor
may apply the payment to debts which are not due, if he has an
express agreement with the debtor to that effect (Shaw v. Pratt
(1839) 22 Pick. (Mass.) 305) but he is under no obligation to
receive payment of such a debt and if he accepts the money he
must apply it as the payer orders (Levystein v. Whitman (1877)
59 Ala. 345).
The creditor has no right to apply unappropriated funds to
claims that are illegal and consequently are not recoverable at
law (Caldwell v. Wentworth (1843) 14 N. H. 431). In Richardson
v. Woodbury (1853) 12 Cush. 279, it was held that if payments
made on account by a debtor be applied by the creditors, under a
previous agreement, to certain items of the account which are
illegal, such payments are valid, and can not afterwards be
revoked by the debtor. This seems to be a recognition of the
principle that a debtor may elect to have his payment applied to
an illegal debt. In an early Maine case, Treadwell v. Moore
(1852) 34 Me. 112, the court decided that debts resulting from
the sale of liquor, which was illegal in Maine by statute, might
be legally credited if the payment was applied by the debtor.
The courts have refused to allow a creditor to apply an un
appropriated payment to debts barred by the statute of limita
tions with the object of reviving them (Pond v. Williams (1854)
1 Gray (Mass.) 630). However, the debtor has the right of
waiving the bar of the statute and may permit such an application
as will renew the former obligations. If he remains silent after
learning that the creditor has applied the payment so as to revive
the outlawed debt, he will be estopped from denying that the
money was paid on such debt (Watt v. Hoch (1855) 25 Pa. 411).
Usually, the creditor has the burden of proving the intent of the
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debtor to renew the outlawed obligation. This intent may be
inferred from accounting entries which were made before the
payment or from the fact that the debtor has paid interest on
the renewed debt. The payment, if part, will generally be
applied toward the barred debt if such is the desire of the debtor,
but the balance of the debt is not revived (Pond v. Williams
(1854) 1 Gray (Mass.) 630). In A yer v. Hawkins (1846) 19 Vt.
26, the court decided that a creditor may apply a general pay
ment to any one of several barred accounts, and this payment
will revive the balance of that particular account, but he will not
be permitted to distribute the credit among the several accounts,
so as to revive them all.
The civil law requires that the creditor make the application
of a general payment very soon after receiving the money from
the debtor; but the common law is more liberal. There is con
siderable conflict among the decisions as to how long the right
exists for the creditor. A few dicta indicate the necessity of
applying within a reasonable time. Between debtor and creditor,
the weight of authority is that an application by the latter at
any time before a controversy arises or a suit is brought will be
good (Bacon v. Dollar Steamship Lines (1923) 290 Fed. 964;
Pierce v. Knight (1859) 31 Vt. 701). If third parties are involved,
the creditor must act within a reasonable time (Robinson v.
Doolittle (1840) 12 Vt. 249). When the time arrives for the
creditor to declare his election, he may not refuse to do so, and
he will not be permitted, to the inconvenience and injury of
others, to hold the application in reserve to await the turn of
future events. The rule is different in England, for in that
country a creditor has been allowed to apply in the witness box
(Seymour v. Pickett (1905) 1 K. B. 715).
Application by the creditor may become fixed by oral declara
tion; by the terms of the receipt rendered; by rendering an
account; by bringing a suit based upon a specific appropriation;
or by any other act showing an intent or inducing a belief that a
particular application has been made (Allen v. Kimball (1839)
23 Pickering (Mass.) 473).
After the appropriation has been made by the creditor, he
can not change it without the consent of the debtor (The Sophia
Johnson (1916) 237 Fed. 406). If the debtor consents, any
change agreeable to both parties is generally permissible (Thomp
son v. Reeves (1926) 170 Ark. 409).
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The creditor has no option with regard to application if the
payment is involuntary on the part of the debtor (Blackstone
Bank v. Hill (1830) 10 Pickering (Mass.) 129). He is under
obligation to apply the payment pro rata to all the unpaid
accounts. This rule is followed where the creditor obtains the
money through judicial proceedings. The share received by a
creditor from an insolvent debtor through an assignment must
be applied pro rata to all the claims against the debtor and not
only to such debts as are otherwise unsecured (Bank of Portland
v. Brown (1843) 22 Maine 295).
If no application has been made or indicated by either the
debtor or the creditor, the duty of appropriation falls upon the
court which will usually apply the payment as it sees fit with
due consideration to the interests of both parties (Harker v.
Conrad (1825) 12 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 301; Pope v. Transparent
Ice Company (1895) 91 Va. 79). According to Justice Story, in
United States v. Kirkpatrick (1824) 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 720:
“The general doctrine is that the debtor has a right, if he
pleases, to make the appropriation of payments; if he omits
it, the creditor may make it; if both omit it, the law will
apply the payments, according to its own notions of justice.”

In some circumstances, the jury, acting on the evidence and
under instructions of the court, will apply (Oliver v. Phelps
(1843) 20 N. J. L. 180).
The court will attempt to follow the intention or understanding
of the parties, before or at the time of payment, if this can be
inferred or implied from the circumstances (Emery v. Tichout
(1841) 13 Vt. 15; Gillett v. Depuy (1900) 63 N. Y. S. 49) but if
this is impossible, it will be guided by a general presumption of
intention founded on reason, probability and justice. In The
Martha (1887) 29 Fed. 708, it was held that that application is
presumed to have been agreed upon to which it is most probable
that the parties would have assented.
The law will usually apply a general payment to a debt which
is due, in preference to one that is not due, since the presumption
is that the debtor intends a payment, not a deposit (Upham v.
Lefavour (1846) 11 Metc. (Mass.) 174). A certain debt is pre
ferred to one which depends upon the happenings of some con
tingency (Snyder v. Robinson (1871) 35 Ind. 311; President v.
Brown (1843) 22 Maine 295). The application will generally be
made to the oldest of several debts (Kloepfer v. Maker (1903)
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84 N. Y. S. 138). If priority is not involved, that debt which
is unsecured or is least secured will receive the credit in the
states following the common-law rule (Barbee v. Morris (1906)
221 Ill. 382). In case the debt which is least secured is not prior
to the others, there are several decisions to the effect that the
time element should be ignored and the application made to the
least secured obligation (Schuelenberg v. Martin (1880) 2 Fed.
747; Smith v. Lewiston Steam Mill (1891) 66 N. H. 613). How
ever, the weight of authority favors application to the earliest
debt (Moses v. Noble (1888) 86 Ala. 407; Wortheley v. Emerson
(1874) 116 Mass. 374). Payment will not be applied to debts
contracted after payment (London v. Parrott (1899) 125 Cal.
472) nor to a future indebtedness (Harrison v. Johnson (1855)
27 Ala. 445) nor to demands which are not enforceable.
In case of continuous accounts, payment will be applied to the
earliest, if there is no express direction or inference to the contrary
(Winnebago Paper Mills v. Travis (1894) 56 Minn. 480). This
point was settled more than a century ago when Justice Story, in
United States v. Kirkpatrick (1824) 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 720, said:
“In cases ... of long and running accounts, where
debts and credits are perpetually accruing, and no balances
are otherwise adjusted than for the mere purpose of making
rests, we are of the opinion, that payments ought to be applied
to extinguish the debts according to the priority of time:
so that the credits are to be deemed payments pro tanto of
the debts antecedently due.”
Application will not usually be made to disputed items (Banner
Grain Company v. Burr Farmers' Elevator (1925) 162 Minn. 334.
Where some of the items are illegal, payment will be applied to
the earliest legal items.
If there is no evidence to the contrary, and the amount paid
by the debtor is exactly equal to one of the several debts, there
are decisions to the effect that the jury may infer that the debtor
intends that the money be applied to that obligation (Seymour
v. Van Slyck, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 403). Whether the debts are of a
higher or a lower order makes no difference in application of
payments to them. (Pennypacker v. Umberger (1854) 22 Pa.
492). For example, if one debt is a specialty and the others are
simple contracts, all will be treated alike in respect to order of pay
ment when the court applies. If the simple contracts were prior
to the specialty they will be paid before the specialty. Priority
is the determining factor, while dignity of the contract is ignored.
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If the creditor of an old firm continues his business with a new
partnership which has taken over the business of the old one,
payments will be applied to the old debt, unless a different
intention of the debtor can be proved. If a firm creditor is also
creditor to a partner, a payment by a partner of partnership
funds should be applied to the partnership debts in preference
to the partner’s personal obligations (Codman v. Armstrong
(1848) 28 Maine 91).
Where interest is due on any account, the courts will use the
payment to settle the interest, and, if there is anything left, it
will be applied upon the principal of the debt (Sheppard v. New
York (1915) 216 N. Y. 251; Jacobs v. Ballenger (1891) 130 Ind.
231). If there are several debts of the same degree, all carrying
interest, a general payment will be applied to all of the interest
before reducing the principal of any one of the obligations. In
Steele v. Taylor (1836) 4 Dana (Ky.) 445, the court said:
“When a debtor fails to make a prompt payment of his
debt, the law has fixed a rate of interest that he shall pay,
as a reasonable compensation to the creditor for the delay.
And, as interest will not bear interest, though it be as justly
due as the principal, the creditor is deprived of the use of
the interest without compensation for it. It is, therefore,
just and equitable, when the credit is left to be applied by
the chancellor, that it should be first applied to the extin
guishment of the whole interest, or that portion of the fund,
which is withheld by the debtor, that draws no interest.”

Let us summarize. The debtor has the right to direct the
application of a voluntary payment; if he fails to use this right,
it passes to the creditor, who, with certain restrictions, may
apply the money as he thinks best. If both the debtor and the
creditor fail to indicate their intention in respect to the appro
priation, the court will take over the right and will apply the
payment according to its idea of justice.
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